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1. Frege and the German Idealists
The received view has it that analytic philosophy emerged in reaction
to the German idealists, above all Hegel, and their British epigones (the
British neo-Hegelians). According to Bertrand Russell, German idealism
failed to achieve solid results in philosophy. The distinguished later an-
alytic philosopher, Michael Dummett, saw Gottlob Frege as a key figure
in the concerted effort to throw off idealism: In the history of philosophy
Frege would have to be classified as a member of the realist revolt against
Hegelian idealism (Dummett [4], 225).
This paper establishes that while Frege too sought solid results
in Russell's sense, and on that count qualifies as analytic philosopher, he
nonetheless took a radically different view of idealism than did Russell.
Frege never spoke against Hegel, Schelling, or Fichte.1 What's more, like
the German idealists, his sworn enemy was empiricism as paradigmatically
exemplified, for Frege, by John Stuart Mill (Bertrand Russell's godfather).
By contrast with empiricism, which he regarded as shallow, Frege dis-
cussed the basis of arithmetic [that] lies deeper, it seems, than that of any
of the empirical sciences (Frege [8], 14).2
Beyond targeting empiricism and evincing other sympathies with
German idealist thinking, Frege actually integrated elements of German
philosophical idealism into his logic. When one takes into account the
scholarly milieu in which Frege pursued his formative studies, the readi-
ness with which he did this is not difficult to explain. Frege served his
philosophical apprenticeship in an academic environment dominated by
German idealists. He attended the University of Jena in the 1870s, where
the faculty was organized into three informal clubs: One was led by the
mathematician Karl Snell; the philosopher Kuno Fischer headed a second
group; and the zoologist and popular philosopher Ernst Haeckel oversaw
1 Dummett's explanation: Frege barely troubled to attack Idealism at all; he simply passed it by
(Dummett [4], 225) is not convincing.
2 This claim is clearly opposed to the message of the manifesto of the Vienna Circle, one of the most
important documents of the early analytic philosophy: There are no depths in science (Hahn
[26], 15).
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the third club. Frege belonged to Snell's Sunday Circle which met un-
til 1880. Through the mediation of philosophy professor Karl Fortlage,
however, this group, influenced by Schelling and the German Roman-
tics, maintained close contact with Kuno Fischer's group, in which the
thought of Kant and Hegel predominated (Kreiser [32], 13).3 Add to this
that Snell was the teacher and intellectual guide of Frege's professor and
mentor Ernst Abbe (Snell's son-in-law) and it should come as no surprise
that Frege attached high importance to his participation in the Sunday
Circle.
The first Anglophone scholar to point out what Frege's thought
owes to nineteenth-century Germany philosophy was Hans Sluga.4 Sluga
argued that Frege followed the philosophical-logical tradition originating
with Leibniz and Kant, and which Trendelenburg and Lotze developed
significantly just prior to and into Frege's time. Sluga has identified this
current of philosophical thought as the tradition of classical German phi-
losophy. About the same time, a philosophical historian writing in Ger-
man, Gottfried Gabriel, did much to bring this tradition to light, casting
Frege as neo-Kantian (Gabriel [21]).
Advancing beyond Sluga and Gabriel, the present paper reveals that
through the mediation of Trendelenburg and especially of Lotze many el-
ements of German idealism found their way into Frege's logic and phi-
losophy. Indeed, albeit clearly intending to transform the philosophy of
the time, Trendelenburg and Lotze, while often critical of Hegel, were not
anti-Hegelian. Rather, their objective was to reform German idealism.
Under Hegel's influence Trendelenburg, senior to Lotze by fifteen
years, began to explore thinking as a process. As a result, he changed
the very architecture of the received philosophical logic. As V. Peckhaus
explains, the traditional [Aristotelian] core, the theory of inferences, with
syllogistics at its center, was pushed into the background. The new core
was the theory of judgment (Peckhaus [40], 16). Lotze, for his part, was
an openly eclectic philosopher who while renouncing Leibniz, undertook
to systematize the most pregnant thoughts of Kant, Hegel, Fichte and
Schelling (Milkov [38]).
What needs to be borne in mind here is that Trendelenburg and
Lotze influenced Frege along fundamentally different lines. Trendelenburg
3 See also Sluga [46], 321.
4 In Germany, this connection was well-known. Bruno Bauch, for example, discussed it in [1], 62.
See also Goedeke [22], 116. Scholz [43] too connected Frege's ideas with those of Leibniz and Kant.
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looms as a defining influence in Frege's effort to formulate an artificial lan-
guage that can better express our thoughts, something Frege first presented
in the Conceptual Notation (1879, see also Frege [17]). Lotze's impact be-
comes evident mainly immediately after that, when Frege was to make
philosophical sense of his lingua characterica. As we shall see through the
course of this discussion, German idealism exerted a formative influence
on Frege both early and late in his philosophical development.
That said, the received view is nonetheless accurate in that there
were many respects in which Frege and the German idealists were an-
tipodal. Above all, Frege stressed discursive exactness as opposed to di-
alectical transition from one characterization or formula into another
(Hegel [27],  81). Moreover, he did not hesitate to marry mathematics
and philosophy: Frege was convinced that philosophy could thereby make
mathematics more precise. The classical German idealists, by contrast, as
well as such distinguished successors as Trendelenburg and Lotze, counted
themselves pure philosophers and so refused on principle to incorporate
logical or mathematical formulas in their theoretical explorations.
All of this led Frege scholars erroneously to conclude that Frege was
a philosophical logician who was radically anti-Hegelian. As has already
been adumbrated, Frege borrowed many elements of the philosophy of the
German idealists. In what might otherwise strike one as paradoxical, these
elements proved instrumental, we shall see, to Frege in achieving rigor and
exactness in logic.
2. Anti-Mechanicism, Pro-Organicism
We have noted that while the classical Aristotelian logic started with
concepts, went on to treat judgments (propositions), and ended with in-
ferences, Frege's post-Trendelenburgian logic commenced with judgments
(Frege [7], 94)  and he had good reasons for this.
What Frege most opposed is the so-called aggregative conception
of judgments. The mainstream logicians of his time conceived of judgments
as complexes of concepts.5 They found it difficult to distinguish between
a combination of terms which constitutes a judgment and one which con-
stitutes merely a complex concept (Sluga [44], 483). Frege directed his
5 Russell was one among them, especially before August 1900 (cf. Milkov [37]). Beaney ([2], 203)
also underlines that Frege's functionargument analysis is quite different from the decompositional
conception of analysis embraced by Moore and Russell. Cf. also Hylton [30].
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criticism against these mechanical logicians, most notably George Boole,
who considered thinking a process of pure calculation. Frege found that
Boolean logic represents only part of our thinking; [but] the whole can
never be carried out by a machine or be replaced by a purely mechanical
activity (Frege [5], 35).
This opposition to mechanistic philosophical logic has a long tradi-
tion in German philosophy. It originated with Leibniz who held that in
their analytic predilections, Descartes and Locke went too far. As a correc-
tive, Leibniz reintroduced ideas of Aristotelian metaphysics. The German
idealists employed analogous argumentation, as did Hermann Lotze.
Against the mechanistic logicians, Frege advanced a kind of logi-
cal organicism. This found expression in the fact that, similarly to the
German idealists, he regularly used biological metaphors in his logic. The
following enumeration of Frege's recourse to such metaphors over the years
makes manifest his unswerving commitment to logical organicism:
i. In Boole's Logical Calculus and the Conceptual Notation
(1880/81) Frege maintained that the starting point of his logic is the event
of judging. Judging is a process that organically connects the parts of
the concept. We can discriminate the elements of the concept as discrete
individuals only after the concept is already constructed (Frege [5], 17,
19).
ii. In Foundations of Arithmetic (1884) Frege held that arithmetical
definitions contain in themselves all ordinal numbers, similar to how seeds
contain the trees, and not as beams are contained in a house (Frege [8], 
88).
iii. In Basic Laws of Arithmetic (1893) Frege compared arithmetic
with a tree that unfolds in a variety of methods and axioms, while the
roots go in the depth (Frege [12], xiii).
iv. Four years later (in 1897) Frege declares that our thought is
not an association of ideas  no more than an automaton . . . is a living
being (Frege [13], 145).
v. And seventeen years beyond that we find him asserting that
science must endeavor to make the circle of improvable primitive truths
as small as possible for the whole of mathematics is contained in these
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primitive truths as in a kernel [Keim].6 Our only concern is to generate
the whole of mathematics from this kernel (Frege [16], 204205).
3. Frege's Two Types of Analysis
To grasp the role of Frege's logical organism one needs to recognize that
he employed two concepts of analysis. First, following Kant, Frege re-
garded knowledge in arithmetic as analytic in the sense that we derive it,
deduce it, from definitions and general laws by logical means (Frege [8], 
3): We shall refer to this as anlysis1. Frege determined, however, that
Kantian derivation (deduction) is also synthetic, in the sense that it cre-
ates something new, and he drew attention to this point in Foundations :
The conclusion we draw from it [the definition] extended our knowledge,
and ought therefore, on Kant's view, to be regarded as synthetic; and yet
they can be proved by purely logical means, and are thus analytic (Frege
[8],  88).
Frege's position, we should note, stands clearly opposed to the view,
widely accepted (for example, by Hume and Kant) prior to the ascendancy
of post-Kantian German idealism, that analytic judgments are epistemo-
logically sterile. Also Wittgenstein, lacking Frege's background in idealism,
would call analytic judgments tautological. Hegel, on the other hand,
sharply criticized Aristotle's sterile logic, pleading for logic of contentsort
that Frege was to advance too (cf. section 7).
The second type of analysis (call it analysis2) is decompositional
in nature. The difference between analysis1 and analysis2 becomes patent
when one revisits the previous example of the plant. A plant, to which
Frege relates the particular numbers, is synthesized (or analysed1) in a
process of photosynthesis. We may decompose it, subject it to analysis2,
only afterwards, anatomizing it in order to determine, for instance, its
composition. The living, existing plant, however, cannot as such undergo
analysis2.
While Frege's analysis2 correlates with the scientific analysis, say, in
chemistry, his analysis1 is close to the growth and self-maintenance (syn-
thesis) that distinguish biological organisms. Regrettably, many Fregeans
6 Apparently for analytic reasons, Frege's Keim was often translated as kernel, instead of as
germ.
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uncritically adopted the received judgment that the master was an an-
alytic philosopher pure and simple. As a consequence they did much
to play down the pivotal difference between the two alternative senses of
analysis with which Frege operated, when they didn't simply ignore it.
An additional factor that militates against properly understanding
Frege on this score is that he was, without question, also an adept at
analysis2. He maintained, for example, that logicians have the task of iso-
lating what is logical from psychology and language, and doing so in the
same way that scientists undertake to isolate the elements of chemistry.
There is more to Frege's position, however, since even when we have com-
pletely isolated what is logical in some form or phrase from the vernacular
or in some combination of words, our task is still not complete. What we
obtain, observes Frege, will generally turn out to be complex; we have to
analyse this, for here as elsewhere we only attain full insight by pressing
forwards until we arrive at what is absolutely simple (Frege [9], 6).
In short, the method of decompositional analysis plays a formative
role in Frege's philosophical logic. This sort of analysis became especially
prominent in his thought five years after he published his Conceptual No-
tation, in particular, when he discovered that numbers are objects and
when concepts began to serve a defining role in his logic (Weiner [51], 70).
These developments notwithstanding, analysis1 prevailed over analysis2 in
Frege's thinking. It is of more than passing interest that this tendency
finds a parallel, as we shall see, in the prime role of quantification theory
over propositional calculus in his logic (see section 8, below).
4. Saturatedness: Chemical or Biological
Metaphor?
The standard account has it that Frege borrowed from chemistry the
metaphor saturated/unsaturated which he employs to characterize the
relation between function and argument (Potter [41], 13). On this matter,
as with those noted in the preceding section, commentators have simply
presumed that Frege was analytic philosopher  whatever they take this
notion precisely to mean. Is this view correct?
Before probing the meaning of saturated [gesättigt ] as Frege uti-
lized it, one should be aware that the metaphor in question derives not
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from chemistry but from biology: the German term satt  (full up) ap-
plies to organisms when their striving or desire to eat is satisfied. Be this
as it may, scholars invoke this biological term across a wide range of non-
biological disciplines: from epidemiology and demography to economics (a
market can be saturated) and mathematics. In chemistry saturation is
understood as the point at which a solution of a substance can dissolve no
more of that substance7  which is to say it means the achieving of a final
stable state by one mass individual as a result of a dynamic process.
Frege however conceived the notion of being gesättigt along com-
pletely different lines. He held that in logic the argument does not be-
long with a function, but goes together with the function to make up a
complete whole [vollständiges Ganzes ] (Frege [10], 140). In other words,
Frege's concept and object are two individuals that fuse in order to build
up the organic unity of a thought  like two cells that merge in order
to constitute a germ:8 one of them ungesättigt , the other one capable
to make the first one satt . Frege held that we invariably subvert such
a thought, once formulated, by subjecting it to analysis1. Similarly, he
maintained that we do not construct a concept by subsuming the subject
under the predicate. Rather, concept's different elements (its character-
istics [Merkmale]) grow together (wachsen zusammen)  are synthesized
 so as to form (build) it.
In an unpublished review of Arthur Schoenflies' book The Logical
Paradoxes of Set-theory, Frege noted: The unsaturatedness of one of the
components is necessary, since otherwise the parts do not hold together.
Of course two complete wholes can stand in a relation to one another; but
then this relation is a third element  and one that is doubly unsaturated
(Frege [15], 177). In light of this position it comes as no surprise that
when he read Wittgenstein's Tractatus Frege questioned: What is the
thing that binds [the objects in a state of affairs] (Frege [20], 53)? To
Frege's way of thinking such a connection should be a kind of concrescence
(Zusammenwachsen) of the two (or more) objects into one.9
This judgment reflects Frege's view that one of the purposes of the
function/argument and concept/object distinction is to replace the idea
7 Saturation: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saturation_(chemistry)
8 As already mentioned in section 2 (v), Frege's term Keim was often translated as kernel instead
of as germ (see footnote 6).
9 It is interesting to compare Frege's solution of this problem with that of Wittgenstein who was
much more pronounced defender of analysis2. According to Wittgenstein, the elements of the
state of affairs hold together because of their topology alone: no fusion, as well as no mortar that
connects them together is needed (cf. Milkov [36]).
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that the content of a sentence is composed of constituents that are merely
subsumed in one complex. Indeed, the Booleans had assumed concepts to
be pre-existent and ready-made and judgments to be composed from them
by aggregation (Sluga [47], 85). Frege, on the other hand, taught that
concepts and propositions are to be synthesized, created (cf. section 2, (i)).
This idea of creation simply does not obtain when one takes saturation
in the chemical sense: no creation occurs in chemical saturations.
5. Life
Beyond Frege's recourse to the saturation metaphor, his organicism ap-
pears in a number of other forms. Perhaps the most significant instance
stands at the very center of his philosophical logic, namely in the idea that
thinking  the subject-matter of logic  is to be understood as embedded
in human life.
When we are awake, we cognitively react to the events and situations
of the external world, thus making judgments. Moreover, in judgments we
advance (fortschreiten), asserts Frege, from a thought to its truth-value.
This is the case since when we judge in real life, we are, as Frege puts it,
serious. In other words, in real life we know that matters have irreducibly
practical import and that ultimately our survival is at stake when it comes
to judging matters correctly. In contrast, when we play, we are not, in
Frege's view, serious  we are not preoccupied with real life.10 In play, our
sentences accordingly have no truth-value. What they betoken is simply
the exercise of our free will. In such cases what we produce is merely a
series of obiter dicta, not propositions.
We can see now why judgment played a central role in Frege's logic:
he argued in On Sense and Meaning that judgment is something quite
peculiar and incomparable (Frege [11], 165). Judgment is such because it
is the event (das Fortschreiten) that intrinsically connects logic to life.
Frege went on to claim that when we make judgments, we strive for
truth. This striving is the motor that connects logic with the world: It
is the striving for truth that, as he put it, drives us always to advance
from the sense to the thing meant (Frege [11], 163).
10 Cf. with Friedrich Schiller's famous saying Life is serious, art is cheerful from the prologue to
Wallensteins Lager. That Frege was well acquainted with Schiller's works is clear from his reference
to Don Carlos (Frege [13], 130). Frege also often opposed poetry to truth (Frege [12], xxi) with
a hint to the subtitle of Goethe's autobiography Aus meinem Leben. Dichtung und Wahrheit.
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It is evident from the foregoing that, like Hegel's logic and that of
Lotze, Frege's logic is markedly anthropological in character. He argued
that logic is embedded in human life and as such is a logic of human beings
of flesh and blood, not a logic of robots or other machines.
6. Logical Voluntarism
Besides championing organicism in his philosophy of logic, Frege asserted
that to make a judgment is to make a choice between opposing values,
between truth and falsehood. The judgment acknowledges the truth of
the content. We grasp, he declares, the content of a truth before we
recognize it as true, but we grasp not only this; we grasp the opposite
as well. When asking a question we are poised [schwanken wir ] between
opposite sentences (Frege [9], 7; emphasis added) until we decide, in an
act of will, its truth-value.
Frege's terms before and poised show that judgments are pro-
cesses.11 More precisely, a judgment is an act of inquiring whether a
thought be true or false. It is based on our intuition  on the feeling
that our thoughts constitute either a correct or a mistaken assessment of
reality. Frege maintained, moreover, that the process of accepting one of
[the truth-values] and rejecting the other is one act (Frege [14], 185): an
act of exploration, one followed by an act of decision. Frege's activist view
of judgment proved of fundamental importance in his logic, and gives us
leave to speak of a Fregean logical voluntarism. This logical voluntarism
found expression in Frege's claim that assertoric force is one of the consti-
tutive elements of our articulation of a judgment12  a position that reveals
another facet of Frege's debt to German idealism, particularly to the philos-
ophy of J. G. Fichte. Wittgenstein, who in contrast to Frege had, as we've
noted, no idealist background, promptly rejected this thinking as Frege
gave expression to it in his logical symbolism: Frege's `judgment stroke'
``' , declared Wittgenstein, is logically quite meaningless (Wittgenstein
[52], 4.442).
11 This point supports Paul Linke's statement that Frege actually brought psychology into, meaning
right inside, his new foundations for logic (Linke [33], 67). His severe criticism of psychologism
can be explained with the fact that he confused the bad psychology which was prospering at the
time with psychology in general (Linke [33], 69).
12 This conception was developed further by J. L. Austin, the first translator of Frege's Grundlagen
into English, in the concept of illocutionary force.
97
Significantly, Frege was convinced that this voluntarism does not
contradict the objectivity of logic that he defended. His conviction on this
head appears to derive from the fact that his Conceptual Notation was a
language (lingua characterica)13 and so intrinsically connected with Being,
understood as an absolute singularity.14 From this it follows, on Frege's
view, that when two persons judge a situation seriously, in his sense,
they make the same judgment. In other words, the seriousness secures
the objectivity of judgments  a position that Michael Dummett saw fit to
label as realist.
At the same time, however, it is also the case that thinking is possi-
ble, according to Frege, only because it originates with the activity of the
human will. This, of course, is an anti-realist position, one that exhibits
affinities with Kant's epistemology. Indeed, according to Kant himself the
knowing person constructs his knowledge. This point goes some way to-
ward explaining why Frege didn't see himself as an anti-Kantian logician,
and also why among the host of commentators on Frege the majority of
those who have a thorough grounding in Kant and in the Kantian tradi-
tion (Scholz [43], Sluga [45], Gabriel [21], Carl [3]) have not hesitated to
identify Frege as a Kantian philosopher of logic.
7. Logic of Content
Beyond its other debts to German idealist thinking, Frege's logic also par-
alleled Hegel's project for a logic of content that opposed the formal logic
of the Kantian type. Frege articulated his logic of content along two lines:
(i) In Conceptual Notation (1879) he sought to establish a lingua
characterica, not just a calculus ratiotinator. This program undertook to
present the thinking process in a transparent way, one that would yield
a perspicuity of presentation (Übersichtlichkeit der Darstellung) of it
(Frege [6], 88).15
Frege aimed to replace inconvenient, ordinary language that devel-
ops spontaneously and that manifests many defects, as measured against
his new language. He was convinced that his new language would prove to
13 We are going to speak more about this in section 7 below.
14 Many worlds are typical for Russell and Carnap, not for Frege (cf. Milkov [39]).
15 My translation from German  N. M. This term was often used by the later Wittgenstein.
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be a vehicle in which our thought finds its true articulation. Arguably, this
project had its roots in philosophia teutonica16 that followed the Protes-
tant principle which put the world of mind into its own home, so that it
contemplates, knows and feels what otherwise lies beyond it, in its own
terms (Hegel [28], 8267) and doesn't investigate it from outside, through
quasi-objective principles. This impelled Frege to investigate thinking ac-
cording to its own laws, and not with the help of formalist schemes.17
In order to present our thinking in its true form, Frege employed
the relation of logical signs in two dimensions, something that resulted in
his complex conceptual notation. As Frege saw it, the spatial relations
of written symbols on a two-dimensional writing surface can be employed
in far more diverse ways to express inner relationships than the mere fol-
lowing and proceeding in one-dimensional time, and this facilitates the
apprehension of that to which we wish to direct our attention (Frege [6],
87) (cf. Milkov [35]).
This original approach to logic made feasible the allegedly impossi-
ble marriage between this formal discipline and autonomous philosophical
exploration. With its help Frege circumvented logicians like Boole, Graß-
mann, Jevons and Schröder, all of whom failed to connect logical forms
with philosophical content (Frege [6], 88). He also left behind the tra-
ditional German philosophers, including those who were well versed in
mathematics and logic, like Hermann Lotze and Edmund Husserl, who
strictly adhered to the dogma not to incorporate what are merely formal
tools as substantive components of philosophical development.
(ii) The second line along which Frege developed his logic of content,
beginning in Conceptual Notation, was that of logical semantics, which he
treated as judgeable content. In the early 1890s he further developed
formal semantics by introducing the idea of the sense of a proposition.
This innovation anchored Frege's logic in the world and thus categorically
differentiated it from the constructs of the formal logicians. Indeed, his
Conceptual Notation was not only logic but also a language that is intrin-
sically connected with Being18 understood as an absolute singularity, and
also with life.
16 Already R. M. Martin saw Frege's logic as following the German traditions opposing the English
tradition in logic as presented by J. S. Mill and his friends (cf. Martin [34], 8).
17 This point found expression in the fact that while Kant investigated the pure reason, Frege's logic
explored pure thinking.
18 Cf. footnote 14.
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8. Intensional Logic
Frege's logic is intensional in that in it a function ranges over every ar-
gument that falls under it, and a concept defines every object that falls
under it: The concept has a power of collecting together far superior to
the unifying power of synthetic apperception (Frege [8],  48). And this
is not because the objects are spatial or temporal parts of concepts. It
follows, rather, from the circumstance that the objects obey the laws of
concepts. The essential point to note here is that the dependence relation
is not immediate or intuitive  it is not realized because of inclusion in
the volume of the whole. Rather, it is abstract: it is dependence from a
distance.
The intensional stance that distinguishes Frege's logic also governs
the relation between propositional and predicate calculus. As van Hei-
jenoort has noted, in Frege's system the propositional calculus subsists
embedded in quantification theory. . . . In that system the quantifiers bind-
ing individual variables range over all objects (Heijenoort [29], 325).
A similar line of thought had earlier appeared in the German ideal-
ists, according to whom the Idea (the Absolute) determines the charac-
teristics and behavior of all individuals that fall under it with necessity of
a law. One way to appreciate the singular nature of this conception is to
compare it to the idealist aspect of Spinoza's thinking, which pictures in-
dividuals as mere accidents of substance (Inwood [31], 304). The fact that
German idealist thought-determinations substantiate Frege's new logic19
should hardly be surprising given that some of his contemporaries who
lacked his comprehensive background in German idealism, Carl Stumpf,
for example, also elaborated a radically anti-psychologist and anti-Millian
philosophy of arithmetic, albeit one which was based on mereological logic
(Stumpf [50]).20
Significantly, the absolute primacy that Frege's logic of quantifiers
accorded the function and the concept introduced a new emphasis on the
role of individuals in logic  indeed, the power of the general term makes
it possible to fix the parameters of the particular that falls under it with
19 Of course, we would not deny that main inspiration of Frege's logic were Cauchy and Weierstrass,
not Hegel or Schelling (cf. Grattan-Guinness [23]).
20 Interestingly enough, between 1871 and 1874 Stumpf and Frege (both born in 1848) were at the
University of Göttingen  Frege as doctoral student and Stumpf as Privatdozent.
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signal exactness. It was in this way that Frege foregrounded the problem-
atic of reference, which was to become defining topic of twentieth-century
philosophy of language.
Frege's intensional first-order logic has been subjected to consid-
erable criticism on this point. A prominent recent commentator, Barry
Smith, dismisses it as fantology (Smith [48]). While no one would deny
that first-order logic has great expressive and inferential power, it lacks
the resources to treat objects of the real world, such as universals, types,
processes, and, we might add, mereological entities. Smith objects that its
universe of discourse consists of particular items only (Smith [49], 110).
Frege's first-order logic is of use only in mathematics, the objects of which
are not situated in space and time. For object of the real world, on the
other hand, one must have recourse to an alternative to predicate logic,
namely a logic of terms.
Over the years, Frege accorded increasing significance to the role
of intensions in logic. In Function and Concept he replaced the naïve
functionargument logic of Conceptual Notation with logic of course-of-
value (Wertsverlauf ) of concepts. As the very name of this logic suggests,
in contrast to the positions of the parts that constitute mereological wholes,
the position of an individual (or argument) in a course of value is intrinsi-
cally indeterminate: it is floating  a factor that Frege symbolized with a
curve  until it is identified. In his epistemology Frege spoke about course-
of-images (Vorstellungsverlauf ) (Frege [6], 83, 87) that can be determined
only through his Conceptual Notation. Apparently, the indeterminateness
of the general (the absolute) was Frege's leading theoretical stance.
Russell readily embraced Frege's new logic, particularly in his idea
of denoting phrases.21 He regarded the latter as a pivotal innovation,
this because denoting phrases can indicate infinite collections of individ-
uals with the help of singular (intensive) concepts; and they can do this
precisely because their denotation is undetermined. Russell was convinced
that this discovery resolves the paradox of infinity.22 It was not long,
however, before Russell detected another paradox: the paradox of classes.
Apparently, Frege's logic simply led Russell to relocate paradox from one
domain, the realm of infinity, to another, the realm of classes that range
over infinite number of individuals (Milkov [37], 54). In other words, the
21 Russell first learned Frege's logic of quantification via Peano in August 1900.
22 To this we would add that Russell was sensitive to the problem of infinity because of his Hegelian
past: infinity was, according to Hegel, a prime paradox.
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paradox of classes was a consequence of embracing class-concepts that
range over infinite numbers of individuals.
Over the last hundred years or so it has turned out that the most
effective way to address the paradox of classes is to accept multitudes
that do not fall under a class-concept that ranges over them.23 In other
words, the paradoxes disappear when we abandon those ideas in Frege's
logic that were supported by the philosophy of the German Idealism.
9. Epilogue
The foregoing history provides a considerably richer context than that of
the received view for understanding of how Bertrand Russell advanced the
project for a new, analytic philosophy as a philosophy that can make
verifiable progress. Analytic inquiry of the sort he championed achieves
its theoretical results step by step, such that if a particular philosophi-
cal theory proves false, some components of the theory may nonetheless
be preserved  just as elements of refuted theories of science can be pre-
served.
What this essay has principally striven to make clear, however, is
that the philosophical thought had made important progress along these
lines long before Russell. The philosophy of the German idealism had
introduced, decades earlier, new ideas that survived the demise of the
grand theories that originally framed them. Later, succeeding generations
thinkers who subscribed to a quite different methodology and who styled
themselves as analytic philosophers were to reintroduce these originally
idealist notions in totally different programs of inquiry. This explains
much of the difficulty in recognizing these notions as they figure in leading
currents of contemporary philosophical discourse. To make these origins
and their philosophically pregnant implications explicit is the task of the
historian of philosophy.
23 See Gödel [24], 135.
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